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Presidential Pronouncements of Customary
International Law as an Alternative to the Senate’s
Advice and Consent
Eric Talbot Jensen∗
Abstract: The Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law of
the United States has thus far focused on the status of treaties in
United States law, and has not specifically considered the topic of
customary international law. While the American Law Institute
undoubtedly has good reasons for its approach, there is an emerging
presidential practice that should catch the attention of the drafters and
encourage them to make at least a small foray into customary
international law’s impact on the domestic law of the United States.
This practice consists of presidents proclaiming to the international
community that certain provisions of treaties that are currently before
the Senate for its advice and consent have already achieved the status of
customary international law and, therefore, are binding on the United
States, regardless of Senate action. While it appears that the president
has the constitutional authority to determine what is customary
international law as part of his foreign relations power, it is less clear
that he determines the domestic effect of customary international law,
particularly in instances where Congress has intentionally not taken
action on a specific treaty. The Restatement (Fourth) has the
opportunity to clarify the domestic effect of such presidential actions.

* Associate Professor, J. Reuben Clark Law School (BYU). The author wishes to thank those
who attended the BYU Law Review Symposium and provided excellent comments and
suggestions as well as Grant Hodgson and Caroline Lamb for invaluable research assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
Article II, Section 2 of the United States Constitution tells the
president that “He shall have power, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the
Senators present concur.” 1 Article VI then states that “all Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.” 2 These two
constitutional provisions establish the recognized and authoritative
method for the federal government to incorporate the content of
international agreements to which the United States is a signatory
into domestic law. As constitutional practice has evolved, the originally
strict understanding of these provisions has grown to include some
controversy on the self-execution or non-self-execution of treaties, 3 and
to allow for the use of executive agreements, 4 congressional-executive
agreements, 5 and even sole executive agreements. 6
In addition to these well-documented and thoroughly discussed
evolutions in constitutional practice, there is a recent development in
U.S. practice that has not previously been analyzed but that

1. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
2. Id. art. VI, cl. 2.
3. MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32528, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND AGREEMENTS: THEIR EFFECT UPON U.S. LAW 7–9 (2014) [hereinafter CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL32528]; see generally David Sloss, Taming Madison’s Monster: How to Fix
Self-Execution Doctrine, 2015 BYU L. REV. 1691 (2016).
4. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32528, supra note 3, at 4–7. It would appear that over
18,500 executive agreements have been concluded by the United States since 1789 (more
than 17,300 of which were concluded since 1939), compared to roughly 1100 treaties that
have been ratified by the United States. However, this estimate seems likely to undercount the
number of executive agreements entered by the United States. As Garcia states, “While the
precise number of unreported executive agreements is unknown, there are likely many
thousands of agreements (mainly dealing with ‘minor or trivial undertakings’) that are not
included in these figures.” Id. at 5.
5. Id. at 5; Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of
International Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236 (2008) (discussing the
constitutional and legislative significance of both treaties and congressional-executive
agreements and arguing for greater use of congressional-executive agreements).
6. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32528, supra note 3, at 6. Though there are fewer of
these in quantity, they often cause quite a bit of concern when they are made. However, the
United States Supreme Court has upheld such agreements on several occasions. See, e.g., Am.
Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654
(1981); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
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potentially has a significant impact on the larger question of the
treaty process under the Constitution and the concurrent application
of customary international law (CIL) as part of the “supreme Law of
the Land.” 7 This emerging practice is a declaration by the president
that portions of a treaty are CIL and binding on the United States,
even while that treaty is at the Senate for its advice and consent.
Three primary examples are sufficient to demonstrate this
emerging trend in congressional-executive branch interaction: The
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS
III), 8 the Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 1949
(APII), 9 and Article 75 of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 (API). 10 In all three cases, the president sent
the treaty for advice and consent to the Senate, which took no
action. Despite this congressional inaction, or perhaps in response to
it, subsequent presidents have made statements or taken actions that,
to greater or lesser degrees, proclaim that certain provisions or all of
the presented treaties have become part of CIL and are binding on
the United States and its agencies. The effect of such presidential
action is to bind the United States, as a matter of international law,
to apply those treaty provisions. Presidents have then further
directed various executive agencies to follow these provisions of
newly minted CIL and provided domestic legal ramifications for
failure to do so.
This particular “lawmaking” exercise by the president is unique
and has not garnered much attention from either Congress or
academics. Despite recent claims about presidential authority with
respect to the foreign affairs power, 11 no one has claimed for the
president this application of authority under the Constitution.

7. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
8. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994).
9. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), opened for
signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II].
10. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 75, opened for
signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I].
11. See Michael D. Ramsey, The Textual Basis of the President’s Foreign Affairs Power, 30
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 141 (2006) (arguing that the foreign affairs power was understood
to be part of the executive power at the time the Constitution was ratified); David Gartner,
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The Restatement (Fourth) has the opportunity to clarify the
domestic effect of such a presidential statement. This clarification is
especially significant with respect to presidential statements that
subsequently become binding on the actions of executive agencies
and carry legal repercussions for non-compliance.
Part I of this Article will provide a very basic overview of the
formation of CIL and its application in U.S. domestic law as the
“supreme Law of the Land.” 12 Though this is a contested area of
foreign relations law, Part I will make some assumptions in order to
avoid reengaging in this debate and instead try to distill principles
that are important to the specific question presented in this Article.
With Part I as background, Part II will then analyze the three
previously referenced examples where the president has submitted a
treaty to the Senate for its advice and consent and subsequently, in
the face of Senate inaction, proclaimed provisions of those treaties or
those treaties as a whole to be accepted CIL and binding on the
United States. Part III will further illustrate how subsequent
presidential actions have had the effect of making those provisions
binding on executive agencies as a matter of domestic law. Part IV
will then discuss the relevance of this phenomenon to the
Restatement (Fourth) and argue that the Restatement has the
opportunity to address this issue and clarify the domestic effect of
such presidential actions. The Article will conclude in Part V.
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW
International law, at its most basic level, is the law that governs
the interaction of nations, 13 though its competence is gradually
growing to include many non-state entities, including individuals. 14

Foreign Relations, Strategic Doctrine, and Presidential Power, 63 ALA. L. REV. 499 (2012)
(examining the rise of the president’s foreign affairs power).
12. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
13. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 101 (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (describing international law as the “rules and principles
of general application dealing with the conduct of states and of international organizations and
with their relations inter se, as well as with some of their relations with persons, whether
natural or juridical”); CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32528, supra note 3, at 1.
14. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 1 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
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Modern international law can generally be divided into two broad
categories: treaty law and custom (or CIL). 15
The next section will focus on CIL. It will be followed by a
section that discusses the role of CIL in U.S. domestic law.
A. Customary International Law
As opposed to treaties which are “international agreement[s]
concluded between States [meaning nations] in written form and
governed by international law,” 16 CIL is often unwritten law
governing the actions of nations. 17 It comes from the experience of
history and has often grown and developed over extensive periods of
time. 18 For example, many concepts of modern CIL were first
espoused by Grotius, 19 Gentili, 20 Vattel, 21 and Pufendorf. 22 As these
15. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 933 [hereinafter I.C.J. Statute]; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 (AM. LAW INST. 1987); see also id. ch. 1, intro.
note (“International law is made in two principal ways—by the practice of states (“customary
law”) and by purposeful agreement among states (sometimes called “conventional law,” i.e.,
law by convention, by agreement). Until recently, international law was essentially customary
law: agreements made particular arrangements between particular parties, but were not
ordinarily used for general law-making for states. In our day, treaties have become the principal
vehicle for making law for the international system; more and more established customary law
is being codified by general agreements. To this day, however, many rules about status,
property, and international delicts are still customary law, not yet codified.”). Customary
international law can also be ascertained by an appeal to “the general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations; . . . [and] judicial decisions and the teachings of the most
highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of
rules of law.” I.C.J Statute, supra note 15, art. 38(1); see also CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL32528, supra note 3, at 1; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 102 (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (stating that in addition to treaties and
custom, international law may also be derived from “[g]eneral principles common to the major
legal systems” of the world).
16. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2, ¶ 1(a), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
17. See generally Joel P. Trachtman, The Obsolescence of Customary International Law
(Oct. 21, 2014) (unpublished manuscript),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2512757 (arguing that CIL is obsolete and should be replaced with international
agreements and soft law).
18. John W. Foster, The Evolution of International Law, 18 YALE L.J. 149 (1909).
19. HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE (1625).
20. ALBERICO GENTILI, DE JURE IURE BELLI LIBRI TRES (John C. Rolfe tran.,
Clarendon Press 1933) (1589).
21. EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS (Béla Kapossy & Richard Whatmore eds.,
Liberty Fund, Inc. 2008).
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historical norms are accepted as governing principles in the
interaction of nations, they enter the realm of CIL. The Restatement
(Third) acknowledges this reliance on the historical actions of
nations and proclaims that CIL “results from a general and
consistent practice of states [known as ‘state practice’] followed by
them from a sense of legal obligation.” 23
Establishing this state practice does not require universal
compliance, 24 but does involve widespread and representative
adherence, particularly among those nations that are specially
affected by the norm. 25 Practice may be demonstrated in many
different ways, including “diplomatic acts and instructions as well as
public measures and other governmental acts and official statements
of policy, whether they are unilateral or undertaken in cooperation
with other states . . . .” 26 This practice must also be accompanied by
a sense of legal obligation, otherwise known as opinio juris. 27 In
other words, the fact that nations consistently take some specific
action is insufficient to create a principle of CIL. Those actions also
have to be acknowledged by those nations as being legally required.
The importance of establishing what is and what is not CIL is
highlighted by the fact that once a norm is accepted as CIL, it is
binding on all nations who do not persistently object to it. 28 This
means that a nation may become bound by a practice that it does not
accept as legally required and that it specifically does not adhere to,

22. SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBRI OCTO (1672).
23. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
24. Id. § 102 cmt. b.
25. Id.; see also North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den./Ger. v. Neth.), Judgment,
1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 73 (Feb. 20).
26. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
27. See id. § 102 cmt. c (“For a practice of states to become a rule of customary
international law it must appear that the states follow the practice from a sense of legal
obligation (opinio juris sive necessitatis); a practice that is generally followed but which states
feel legally free to disregard does not contribute to customary law. A practice initially followed
by states as a matter of courtesy or habit may become law when states generally come to
believe that they are under a legal obligation to comply with it. It is often difficult to
determine when that transformation into law has taken place. Explicit evidence of a sense of
legal obligation (e.g., by official statements) is not necessary; opinio juris may be inferred from
acts or omissions.”); see also North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. at ¶ 77.
28. Trachtman, supra note 17, at 18.
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unless it has vigorously opposed that notion with respect to its legal
obligations. And even then, if the principle is found to be a
peremptory norm, such objection will not spare the nation of the
legal obligation. 29
B. CIL and U.S. Domestic Law
The application of CIL to the United States is “ambiguous and
sometimes controversial.” 30 This is true for many reasons, including
the method of CIL formulation. Scholars and government officials
have raised the objection that because CIL is an undemocratic
method of law formulation, 31 it should be considered skeptically with
respect to its binding nature in U.S. domestic law. 32 As a counter to
that skepticism, proponents of CIL point to numerous references to
international law in both the Declaration of Independence 33 and the
Constitution, 34 as well as in The Federalist papers. 35 Indeed, the 1900
Supreme Court Case of The Paquette Habana is famously quoted for
the proposition that “[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must
be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of

29. Dinah Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L.
291, 313–14 (2006). A peremptory norm is a “rule[] of international law that admit[s] of no
derogation and that can be amended only by a new general norm of international law of the
same value.” Id. at 297.
30. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32528, supra note 3, at 2; Saikrishna Prakash, The
Constitutional Status of Customary International Law, 30 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 65 (2006).
31. Trachtman, supra note 17, at 18–20.
32. Nicole Roughan, Democratic Custom v International Customary Law, 38 VICTORIA
U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 403 (2007); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary
International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L.
REV. 815, 871 (1997).
33. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 5 (U.S. 1776) (“That these United
Colonies . . . as Free and Independent States . . . have full Power to levy War, conclude Peace,
contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things which
Independent States may of right do.”).
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10–11 (discussing Congress’s power concerning the “law
of nations” and to “grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal”); id. at art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (discussing
the president’s power to make treaties—with the advice and consent of the Senate—and to
appoint ambassadors).
35. See e.g. THE FEDERALIST NO. 3 (John Jay) (“It is of high importance to the peace of
America that she observe the laws of nations . . . .”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison)
(“[I]f we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other nations.”).
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appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending
upon it are duly presented for their determination.” 36
However, just stating that international law is part of our law
does not answer the question of how it is part of our law and how it
is to be applied domestically, particularly in the face of other
competing national interests and constitutional principles. This topic
has been hotly debated 37 and will likely continue to be, even if the
Restatement (Fourth) decides to directly address the issue. Specific
judicial tools have been created to help apply CIL in domestic
courts. For example, it is generally accepted that where a controlling
statute or executive action exists, CIL is not applicable, 38 as
demonstrated by the “Later in Time” rule39 and the Charming Betsy
Canon. 40 The Restatement (Third) concludes only that
The President’s authority and duty to take care that a principle of
customary law be faithfully executed, and the doctrine that a new
customary law becomes United States law automatically and
supersedes at least State law, depend on an authoritative

36. 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
37. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 32; William S. Dodge, Customary International
Law and the Question of Legitimacy, 120 HARV. L. REV. F. 19 (2007).
38. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32528, supra note 3, at 2 (citing The Paquete Habana,
175 U.S. at 677, 700); see also, e.g., United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2003); GaloGarcia v. I.N.S., 86 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 1996) (“where a controlling executive or legislative
act . . . exist[s], customary international law is inapplicable”); Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living
in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d
1446, 1453 (11th Cir. 1986). But see Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (holding
that the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, recognized an individual cause of action for
certain egregious violations of the law of nations).
39. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 115 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (“It has . . . not been authoritatively determined
whether a rule of customary international law that developed after, and is inconsistent with, an
earlier statute or international agreement of the United States should be given effect as the law
of the United States.”). However, the Restatement (Third) acknowledges that “[a] new rule of
customary law will supersede inconsistent obligations created by earlier agreement if the parties
so intend and the intention is clearly manifested.” Id. § 102 cmt. j.
40. The Charming Betsy canon comes from the case of Murray v. Schooner Charming
Betsy and holds that statutes enacted by Congress “ought never to be construed to violate the
law of nations if any other possible construction remains.” 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
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determination that the particular principle has in fact become part
of customary law. 41

Despite the lack of clarity concerning the application of CIL as
U.S. domestic law and without trying to resolve those concerns here,
the important point for this Article is that there is at least some
application of CIL in U.S. domestic law and that the president’s
proclamation of an international norm or principle as CIL and
binding on the United States likely carries with it some measure of
legal importance. Given that assumption, the next part will take
three examples of such presidential proclamations and provide a
platform for the analysis of their impact in Part III.
II. THREE CASES OF PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION
Over the past roughly three decades, beginning with Ronald
Reagan, presidents have made statements about the CIL status of
specific treaties or parts of those treaties in order to bind the United
States to those provisions, despite the Senate not providing its advice
and consent. The following sections outline three specific instances
where this has occurred.
A. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
On March 10, 1983, only three months after the completion of
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS
III), 42 President Ronald Reagan issued his Statement on United
States Oceans Policy. 43 Despite confirming that he would not seek
ratification, the president proclaimed that “the convention also
contains provisions with respect to traditional uses of the oceans
which generally confirm existing maritime law and practice and fairly
balance the interests of all states.” 44 In the Statement, the president
made several pronouncements that effectively adopted the majority
41. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED SATES § 111
reporters’ note 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (internal citations omitted).
42. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 8.
43. Ronald Reagan, Statement on United States Oceans Policy (Mar. 10, 1983),
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/31083c.htm.
44. Id.; see generally George D. Haimbaugh, Jr., Impact of the Reagan Administration
on the Law of the Sea, 46 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 151 (1989) (discussing the actions taken by the
Reagan Administration with respect to different maritime claims as a result of UNCLOS III).
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of the provisions of UNCLOS III, pointedly excluding the
provisions contained in Chapter XI 45 dealing with the deep seabed
and its minerals. The Statement contains three important decisions
concerning the application of provisions of the UNCLOS III:
First, the United States is prepared to accept and act in accordance
with the balance of interests relating to traditional uses of the
oceans—such as navigation and overflight. In this respect, the
United States will recognize the rights of other states in the waters off
their coasts, as reflected in the Convention, so long as the rights and
freedoms of the United States and others under international law
are recognized by such coastal states.
Second, the United States will exercise and assert its navigation and
overflight rights and freedoms on a worldwide basis in a manner that
is consistent with the balance of interests reflected in the convention.
The United States will not, however, acquiesce in unilateral acts of
other states designed to restrict the rights and freedoms of the
international community in navigation and overflight and other
related high seas uses.
Third, I am proclaiming today an Exclusive Economic Zone in
which the United States will exercise sovereign rights in living and
nonliving resources within 200 nautical miles of its coast. This will
provide United States jurisdiction for mineral resources out to 200
nautical miles that are not on the continental shelf. Recently
discovered deposits there could be an important future source of
strategic minerals. 46

While the Statement contains the proviso “The policy decisions I
am announcing today will not affect the application of existing
United States law concerning the high seas or existing authorities of
any United States Government agency,” the executive branch—and
particularly the military—has been conducting its operations under
the assumption that they were required as a matter of presidential
directive to apply the provisions of UNCLOS III. In other words,

45. The Convention is now being implemented together with the subsequent
Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982. G.A. Res. 48/263, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/263
(July 28, 1994).
46. Reagan, supra note 43 (emphasis added).
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the practice of the United States since has been to apply these
accepted provisions as CIL and binding domestic regulation. 47
In subsequent actions, succeeding presidents have become even
more convinced of the value of UNCLOS III. UNCLOS III was on
the Treaty Priority Lists of both President Bush 48 and President
Obama. 49 On May 15, 2007, President Bush officially urged the
Senate to ratify UNCLOS III, 50 arguing that “[j]oining will serve
the national security interests of the United States, including the
maritime mobility of our armed forces worldwide.” 51 In response to
the president’s call, “[t]he Senate Foreign Relations Committee
voted 17–4 to” forward UNCLOS III to the full Senate for a vote, 52
though the Senate never provided its advice and consent.
In June 2012, President Obama made another attempt to get
the Senate’s advice and consent when six four-star generals and
admirals (including the vice chairman of the joint chiefs of staff; the
chief of naval operations; the commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard;
and the commanders of U.S. Transportation Command, U.S.
Northern Command, and U.S. Pacific Command) testified before
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. 53 Each of these
commanders urged Congress to provide advice and consent because
ratification was in the best interests of the United States. 54
This ongoing tension between Congress and the executive
branch with respect to UNCLOS III might be portrayed as a

47. See infra, Section III.A.
48. Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 101 AM.
J. INT’L L. 866, 869–71 (John R. Cook ed., 2007).
49. Letter from Richard R. Verma, Assistant Sec’y of Legislative Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of
State, to John F. Kerry, Chairman, Comm. on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate Treaty Priority
List (May 11, 2009), http://www.gc.noaa.gov/documents/gcil_bd_2009TreatyPriority
List.pdf.
50. George W. Bush, President’s Statement on Advancing U.S. Interests in the World’s
Oceans (May 15, 2007), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/
2007/05/20070515-2.html.
51. Id.
52. Kevin Drawbaugh, U.S. Senate Panel Backs Law of the Sea Treaty, REUTERS, Oct.
31, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/10/31/idUSN31335584.
53. Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, “24 Star” Military
Witnesses Voice Strong Support for Law of the Sea Treaty (June 14, 2012),
http://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/chair/release/24-star-military-witnesses-voice-strongsupport-for-law-of-the-sea-treaty.
54. Id.
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prototypical example of the Constitution’s structural separation of
powers. The ongoing discussions and negotiations must occur
because both political branches are required for a treaty to bind the
United States to provisions of international law. Instead it highlights
how the president has used his “executive power” 55 to overcome the
hesitation of Congress and bind the United States through a
declaration of CIL to the provisions of the very treaty to which
Congress will not provide its advice and consent.
As discussed previously, CIL is formed by state practice that is
followed from a sense of a legal obligation, or opinio juris. 56 The
International Court of Justice has held that to reach the level of
supporting the development of a customary norm, the practice must
be “widespread and representative” and include any states that are
“specially affected.” 57 As evidenced by President Reagan’s statement
on UNCLOS III discussed previously, the United States not only
asserts its right to exercise the elements of UNCLOS III, but it also
expects others to honor that assertion as a matter of law, thus
demonstrating opinio juris. To emphasize this, subsequent presidents
have issued directives to executive branch agencies and the military
to comply with the provisions of UNCLOS III, and to do so relying
on the fact that their compliance is based on international law and
that they can expect other nations to recognize the United States’
right, as a matter of international law, to make such assertions. This
action by the United States amounts to a demonstration of state
practice that is followed through a sense of legal obligation and that
relies on a belief of reciprocal obligations and authorities by other
nations, thus confirming the existence of CIL.
In fact, the Introductory Note to the Restatement (Third)’s Part
V on the Law of the Sea refers to President Reagan’s March 1983
statement quoted previously 58 and then concludes: “Thus, by express
or tacit agreement accompanied by consistent practice, the United
States, and states generally, have accepted the substantive provisions
of the Convention, other than those addressing deep sea-bed

55. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
56. See supra Section I.A.
57. North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den./Ger. v. Neth), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J.
Rep. 3, ¶ 73 (Feb. 20).
58. See supra notes 44–48 and accompanying text.
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mining, as statements of customary law binding upon them apart
from the Convention.” 59
The legal result of this is that the president has committed the
United States to the provisions of a treaty to which the Senate has
explicitly refused to provide its advice and consent because it thinks
the legal obligations that would result are ill-advised. 60 Although
presidents have persisted in seeking Senate approval for UNCLOS
III, at this point, it would be a mere formality that carries little legal
weight. As the treaty is undoubtedly non-self-executing, 61 the
provisions of UNCLOS III would not normally carry domestic
effects until further implemented by Congress. Therefore, the advice
and consent of the Senate would serve the purpose of binding the
United States as a matter of international law. But, in this case, the
president has already done that, making Senate action unnecessary
(except with respect to those provisions that the president has not
specifically declared to be CIL).
UNCLOS III is not the only example of presidential action
resulting in an end-run around congressional inaction that leads to
binding international legal norms for the United States. President
Obama has recently done something very similar with Article 75 of
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (API), 62
and with Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of
1949 (APII). 63
B. Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions
With respect to APII, President Reagan submitted that treaty to
the Senate for ratification in 1987 and “recommend[ed] . . . that the
Senate grant advice and consent . . . .” 64 President Reagan
argued that:

59. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,
Part V, introductory note (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
60. See Kristina Wong & Sean Lengell, DeMint: Law of the Sea Treaty Now Dead,
WASHINGTON TIMES (July 16, 2012), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/jul/
16/demint-says-law-sea-treaty-now-dead/?page=al.
61. See generally Sloss, supra note 3.
62. Additional Protocol I, supra note 10.
63. Additional Protocol II, supra note 9.
64. S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-2, at III (1987).
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The United States has traditionally been in the forefront of efforts
to codify and improve the international rules of humanitarian law
in armed conflict, with the objective of giving the greatest possible
protection to victims of such conflicts, consistent with legitimate
military requirements. The agreement that I am transmitting today is,
with certain exceptions, a positive step toward this goal. Its ratification
by the United States will assist us in continuing to exercise leadership
in the international community in these matters. 65

Despite President Reagan’s strong statement of support, the Senate
has taken no action since.
In March of 2011, President Obama issued a fact sheet,
which stated:
Additional Protocol II, which contains detailed humane treatment
standards and fair trial guarantees that apply in the context of noninternational armed conflicts, was originally submitted to the
Senate for approval by President Reagan in 1987. The
Administration urges the Senate to act as soon as practicable on
this Protocol, to which 165 States are a party. An extensive
interagency review concluded that United States military practice is
already consistent with the Protocol’s provisions. Joining the treaty
would not only assist us in continuing to exercise leadership in the
international community in developing the law of armed conflict,
but would also allow us to reaffirm our commitment to humane
treatment in, and compliance with legal standards for, the conduct of
armed conflict. 66

This statement by the president that U.S. practice is already
consistent with the APII’s provisions, combined with the president
urging the Senate to ratify “to reaffirm our . . . compliance with legal
standards,” provides pretty clear evidence that the United States is
applying the provisions of APII as state practice and clearly imply
that the United Stated is doing so out of legal obligation. In other
words, President Obama is declaring APII to be CIL and applying its
provisions as binding on the United States, regardless of the Senate’s
advice and consent.

65. Id.
66. Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: New Actions on Guantánamo and Detainee
Policy, (Mar. 7, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/07/factsheet-new-actions-guant-namo-and-detainee-policy (emphasis added).
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C. Article 75 of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions
Article 75 of API provides an even clearer example. President
Reagan also transmitted API to the Senate but stated that it was
“fundamentally and irreconcilably flawed.” 67 API was also the
subject of an intense Department of Defense review that was
declassified and disseminated to the public only a few months ago. 68
That review, done in 1985, recommended against ratification. 69 And
so, API is also languishing in the Senate with no prospect of action
in the near future. However, in the same March 2011 fact sheet
previously quoted, President Obama stated:
Article 75 of Additional Protocol I, which sets forth fundamental
guarantees for persons in the hands of opposing forces in an
international armed conflict, is similarly important to the
international legal framework. Although the Administration
continues to have significant concerns with Additional Protocol I,
Article 75 is a provision of the treaty that is consistent with our
current policies and practice and is one that the United States has
historically supported.
Our adherence to these principles is also an important safeguard
against the mistreatment of captured U.S. military personnel. The
U.S. Government will therefore choose out of a sense of legal obligation
to treat the principles set forth in Article 75 as applicable to any
individual it detains in an international armed conflict, and
expects all other nations to adhere to these principles as well. 70

This statement by President Obama directly asserting the legal
obligation almost certainly has the force of a binding “unilateral
act” 71 and has the effect of committing the United States to apply
Article 75 as a matter of law in all applicable circumstances, despite
the fact that the Senate has not provided its constitutionally
mandated advice and consent.

67. S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-2, at III.
68. THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, REVIEW OF THE 1977 FIRST ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL
TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949 (1985).
69. Id.
70. See Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: New Actions on Guantánamo and
Detainee Policy, supra note 66 (emphasis added).
71. Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 253, ¶ 43 (Dec. 20).
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D. Conclusion
These three examples illustrate an apparently developing pattern
of presidents turning to CIL as a method of binding the United
States to treaty obligations when they are unable to get the advice
and consent of the Senate. If the Senate will not respond favorably to
the executive’s desire to become party to a treaty, the president can
direct the executive branch to comply with the treaty’s provisions
anyway. Then, the president can either imply the legal obligation, as
with UNCLOS III and APII, or directly state the legal obligation, as
with Article 75 of API, and unilaterally create just as binding of an
international obligation as if the Senate had taken its constitutionally
mandated role.
III. BINDING EXECUTIVE AGENCIES
As established in Part II, the president has committed the United
States to apply specific provisions of treaties to which Congress has
not provided advice and consent, at least as a matter of international
law, by effectively declaring all or part of them to be CIL. However,
as discussed in Part I, the mere declaration may or may not carry the
weight of domestic law, therefore binding the United States,
especially for particular executive agencies. 72 In order for this to
occur, the president has to engage in some further action that makes
his decision binding on the executive branch and punishable upon
non-compliance. 73 Presidents have effectively done this with all three
of the treaties mentioned above. The next three sections will detail
how the president has done this.
A. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
As previously mentioned, the Senate has never provided its
advice and consent to UNCLOS III. As a result, under the
Constitution, the United States is not bound by its provisions,
beyond the obligations that come with being a signatory to a

72.
73.

See supra notes 26–29 and accompanying text.
See id.
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treaty. 74 However, presidential action has had the effect of making
many of the provisions of UNCLOS III not only binding as a matter
of CIL but also binding on the members of executive agencies.
One example of this is the promulgation and enforcement of law
of the sea provisions as described in The Commander’s Handbook on
the Law of Naval Operations, or NWP 1-14M. 75 The NWP 1-14M
“sets out those fundamental principles of international and domestic
law that govern U.S. naval operations at sea,” 76 and is “designed to
provide officers in command and their staffs with an overview of the
rules of law governing naval operations in peacetime and during
armed conflict.” 77 It is promulgated by the Navy, Marines, and Coast
Guard, 78 and restates the requirement that “[a]t all times, a
commander shall observe, and require their commands to observe,
the principles of international law.” 79 Presumably, without any
further implementing actions by the president, his statement that a
provision of UNCLOS III was CIL would now make it an
international law principle. As such, members of the Navy, Marine
Corps, and Coast Guard would be bound to observe this principle.
The legal obligation becomes even clearer throughout the NWP
1-14M. The NWP 1-14M begins with an explanation of the current
status of UNCLOS III with respect to the Senate’s lack of advice and
consent 80 but then goes on to assert that “[a]lthough the United
States is not a party to [UNCLOS III], it considers the navigation
and overflight provisions therein reflective of customary international
law and thus acts in accordance with [UNCLOS III], except for the
deep seabed mining provisions.” 81 The subsequent sections then
rehearse in detail the provisions of UNCLOS III as being the current

74. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 16, at art. 18 (describing
the obligation of signatories not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty prior to its entry
into force).
75. U.S. NAVY, U.S. MARINE CORPS, & U.S. COAST GUARD, THE COMMANDER’S
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (2007).
76. Id. at 19.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1.
79. Id. at 20.
80. Id. at 11.
81. Id.
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law and practice of the United States, 82 even when those provisions
are not in compliance with the United States’ actual legal obligations
under the 1958 Law of the Sea Conventions 83 (the last Law of the
Sea Convention to which the United States was a party) 84 and,
therefore, legally bound. To add clarity to the NWP 1-14M, the
Naval War College issued an “Annotated Supplement” which
provides footnotes with explanations to the provisions of the NWP
1-14M. 85 One example from this annotated version of the NWP 114M will suffice. As an explanation for the drawing of baselines in
order to determine maritime zones, the Annotated Supplement
states: “The current rules for delimiting baselines are contained in
Articles 5 through 14 of [UNCLOS III].” 86 This reference to
UNCLOS III as the legal regime that governs the Navy’s
recognition of baselines is a clear indication of the incorporation, as a
matter of governing executive agencies, of UNCLOS III as a
binding legal norm.
Not only has the president’s acceptance and declaration of
UNCLOS III as CIL become binding on executive agencies but also
failure to follow these rules carries the potential of punishment,
including incarceration. While not technically binding on the Navy,
Coast Guard, and Marine Corps as a statute, 87 failure to abide by the

82. For example, see the discussion of maritime regimes such as territorial seas and the
Exclusive Economic Zone. Id. at 1–2.
83. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, 516
U.N.T.S. 205.
84. See List of Participants in the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/
showDetails.aspx?objid=0800000280033c69 (last visited Sept. 14, 2015).
85. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER’S
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (1997), http://www.fichl.org/
uploads/media/US_Navy_Commander_s_Handbook_Annotated_Supplement_1997.pdf.
Note that the Annotated Supplement is based on the 1995 edition of the NWP 1-14M, not
the more recent 2007 version of the NWP 1-14M. The Annotated Supplement is in the
process of being updated.
86. Id. at 1-3, n.11.
87. The supplement contains the following caveats as to its legal weight:
Although prepared with the assistance of cognizant offices of the General Counsel
of the Department of Defense, the Judge Advocate General of the Navy, The Judge
Advocate General of the Army, The Judge Advocate General of the Air Force, the
Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the Chief Counsel
of the Coast Guard, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Unified Combatant
Commands, the annotations in this Annotated Supplement are not to be construed
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requirements of the NWP 1-14M could certainly be prosecuted as a
dereliction of duty in violation of Article 92 of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, 88 punishable by up to six months in confinement
and being evicted from the military. In this way, the president has an
easy enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance with his
declaration of CIL, despite the Senate’s refusal to provide its advice
and consent.
B. Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions
APII, by definition, applies only to non-international armed
conflicts (NIAC). 89 These are conflicts that do not involve two
nations fighting each other, but generally involve one nation fighting
against an insurgency. NIACs could also involve two or more nations
working together to fight against an insurgent group, 90 even if that
as representing official policy or positions of the Department of the Navy or the
U.S. Government.
Id. at Introductory Note.
Although The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations is a
publication of the Department of the Navy, neither The Handbook nor its
annotated supplement can be considered as a legislative enactment binding upon
courts and tribunals applying the rules of war. However, their contents may possess
evidentiary value in matters relating to U.S. custom and practice. See The Hostages
Trial (Wilhelm List et al), 11 TWC 1237–38, 8 LRTWC 51–52 (U.S. Military
Tribunal, Nuremberg, 8 July 1947–19 Feb. 1948); The Peleus Trial, 1 LRTWC 19
(British Military Ct., Hamburg, 1945); The Belsen Trial, 2 LRTWC 48–49 (British
Military Ct., Luneburg, 1945); The Abbage Ardenne Case (Trial of Brigadefurher
Kurt Meyer), 4 LRTWC 110 (Canadian Military Ct., Aurich, Germany, 1945).
In the course of these cases, the question of the status of such official
publications and the British and U.S. military manuals arose on various occasions.
Although the courts recognized these publications as “persuasive statements of the
law” and noted that, insofar as the provisions of military manuals are acted upon,
they mold State practice, itself a source of international law, it was nevertheless
stated that since these publications were not legislative instruments they possessed
no formal binding power. Hence, the provisions of military manuals which clearly
attempted to interpret the existing law were accepted or rejected by the courts in
accordance with their opinion of the accuracy with which the law was set forth.
Id. at 1 n.1.
88. DEPT. OF DEFENSE, MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL IV-23 (2012).
89. In fact, APII applies to an even narrower subset of NIACs where the nongovernmental fighting force is “under responsible command, [and can] exercise such control
over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military
operations and to implement this Protocol.” Additional Protocol II, supra note 10, art. 1.
90. The International Committee of the Red Cross defines NIAC as “protracted armed
confrontations occurring between governmental armed forces and the forces of one or more
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insurgent group is a transnational entity, such as al-Qaeda. The U.S.
conflict alongside the government of Afghanistan from 2002 until
the present is a good example of a NIAC. In determining what law
would apply to detainees in that conflict, the Supreme Court, in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 91 disagreed with the government’s assertion to the
contrary and confirmed that the conflict in Afghanistan was a NIAC. In
so doing, the Court recognized that the applicable Law of Armed
Conflict (LOAC) governed the treatment and prosecution of individuals
involved in that NIAC who were suspected of violating that law.92
In accord with the Supreme Court’s decision, the Military
Commissions Act of 2009 authorizes the president to “try alien
unprivileged enemy belligerents for violations of the law of war and
other offenses triable by military commission.” 93 This authority has
been exercised by the executive branch, and a number of individuals
are currently on trial. 94 In contrast, despite the Supreme Court’s
determination with respect to the LOAC applicable to the prosecution
of detainees in a NIAC, the United States has a policy of trying its own
service members for substantive crimes such as murder, 95 rather than a
similar LOAC violation that would be applicable to a NIAC.96 This
policy could be seen as undermining the CIL nature of APII’s
provisions on prosecution and trial rights in a NIAC.

armed groups, or between such groups arising on the territory of a State [party to the Geneva
Conventions]. The armed confrontation must reach a minimum level of intensity and the
parties involved in the conflict must show a minimum of organization.” How is the term
“Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED
C ROSS 5 (Mar. 2008), https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paperarmed-conflict.pdf.
91. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
92. Geoffrey S. Corn & Eric Talbot Jensen, Transnational Armed Conflict: A
“Principled” Approach to the Regulation of Counter-Terror Combat Operations, 42 ISR. L. REV.
46, 51 (2009).
93. 10 U.S.C. § 948b(a).
94. See Cases, OFFICE OF MILITARY COMM’NS, http://www.mc.mil/CASES.aspx. (last
visited Nov. 4, 2015).
95. Rules for Courts-Martial 307(c)(2) states that “[a] charge states the article of the
code, law of war, or local penal law of an occupied territory which the accused is alleged to
have violated.” However, the discussion to the same Rule adds: “Ordinarily persons subject to
the code should be charged with a specific violation of the code rather than a violation of the
law of war.” MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 88, at II-27.
96. The Rome Stat. for the Int’l Crim. Court, art. 8(2)(c)(i), U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/9.
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However, even though U.S. service members have not been tried
for violations of the laws of war in a NIAC, the authority to do so is
clearly established by statute. Article 18 of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ) has a long history97 and states: “General
courts-martial also have jurisdiction to try any person who by the law
of war is subject to trial by a military tribunal and may adjudge any
punishment permitted by the law of war.” 98 Thus, insofar as the
provisions of APII are CIL, U.S. service members could be tried for
their violation. And presidential actions from President Reagan to
President Obama all confirm that, for members of the executive
branch, APII is considered CIL and Article 18 of the UCMJ makes
prosecution possible for any violators of those provisions. 99
C. Article 75 of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions
Finally, a very similar argument can be made for Article 75 of
API. API applies to international armed conflicts 100 and neither
President Reagan 101 nor any successive president has urged the
ratification of API. While the statement above from President
Obama shows that he recognizes the flawed nature of API, he goes
on to argue that “[t]he U.S. Government will therefore choose out
of a sense of legal obligation to treat the principles set forth in

97. Jan E. Aldykiewicz & Geoffrey S. Corn, Authority to Court-Martial Non-U.S.
Military Personnel for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed
During Internal Armed Conflicts, 167 MIL. L. REV. 74, 90–101 (2001).
98. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 88, at § 818, art. 18, A2–6.
99. 10 U.S.C. § 818; see also Aldykiewicz & Corn, supra note 97, at 108–44.
100. Additional Protocol I, supra note 9, art. 1. The International Committee of the Red
Cross states that IACS “exist whenever there is resort to armed force between two or more
States.” How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law?,
INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS 5 (Mar. 2008), https://www.icrc.org/eng/
assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf.
101. In his Letter of Transmittal of APII, President Reagan stated with respect to API:
I have at the same time concluded that the United States cannot ratify a second
agreement on the law of armed conflict negotiated during the same period. I am
referring to Protocol I additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which would
revise the rules applicable to international armed conflicts. Like all other efforts
associated with the International Committee of the Red Cross, this agreement has
certain meritorious elements. But Protocol I is fundamentally and irreconcilably
flawed. It contains provisions that would undermine humanitarian law and endanger
civilians in war.
S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-2, at III–IV (1987).
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Article 75 as applicable to any individual it detains in an international
armed conflict, and expects all other nations to adhere to these
principles as well.” 102
As argued above, this statement incorporates Article 75 into
CIL. 103 Additionally, the application of Article 18 of the UCMJ to
violations of CIL, as argued above with respect to APII, makes it
clear that U.S. service members are not only bound to apply Article
75 as a matter of law, but can be punished if they do not. And, of
course, all of this is so, despite the fact that the Senate has the treaty
before it and is not considering granting its advice and consent.
D. Conclusion
These three examples clearly illustrate the impact of presidential
action with respect to treaties that are before the Senate for advice
and consent, but for which consent has not been granted. Despite
the lack of Senate action, presidents have not only effectively
declared the treaties, or provisions thereof, to be CIL and binding
on the United States as a matter of international law, but have also
demanded compliance with their provisions as a matter of domestic
law with respect to executive agencies and have enforced that
demand
with
the
possibility
of
severe
punishment,
including incarceration.
IV. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) AND CLARIFICATION
Perhaps little of this situation is alarming to those who are strong
advocates of the president being the “one voice” in foreign
relations. 104 While the implications of the recently decided Zivotofsky
v. Kerry 105 are still unclear, the Supreme Court’s embrace of the
president as the “one voice” in foreign relations supports the
authoritative nature of the president’s declarations as to the United

102. Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: New Actions on Guantánamo and Detainee
Policy, supra note 66.
103. See supra Section II.C.
104. See David H. Moore, Beyond One Voice, 98 MINN. L. REV. 953, 955–56 (2014)
(analyzing the “one voice” doctrine and then arguing that because it has serious flaws, it
should be abandoned).
105. 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015).
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States’ perspective on the content of CIL. 106 Therefore, the
statements made in Part II should, perhaps, not be troubling.
However, even for those who advocate the president’s role in
pronouncing CIL, his role in enforcing those pronouncements
domestically through punitive means, particularly when the Senate is
already engaged in the ratification process, may cause pause with
respect to separation of powers.
There is some evidence that Congress is starting to get alarmed
by this presidential pattern. In anticipation of President Obama
having Secretary of State John Kerry sign the Arms Trade Treaty
sponsored by the United Nations, 107 Senator Bob Corker, who was
the ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee at the
time, sent a letter to President Obama stating, that “[a]ny act to
implement this treaty, provisionally or otherwise, before the
Congress provides its advice and consent would be inconsistent with
the United States Constitution, law, and practice.” 108
Similar statements could have, but have not, been made by Congress
with respect to the three treaties analyzed above. However, Senator
Corker’s comments raise the specter of the appropriateness of executive
action. Because this is a potentially emerging practice by presidents, the
Restatement (Fourth) has an opportunity to play a role in shaping what
the interaction between the political branches should be.
Three possible options seem to present themselves, though all
three (and potentially others) deserve a much more thorough
analysis than it is possible to provide here. First, the Restatement
(Fourth) could remain silent and allow practice to develop between
the executive and the legislature. Second, the Restatement (Fourth)
could reconfirm the obligation of the United States to not defeat the

106. Id. at 2086.
107. Michelle Nichols, Kerry Signs U.N. Arms Trade Treaty, Says Won’t Harm U.S.
Rights, REUTERS, (Sept. 25, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/25/us-unassembly-kerry-treaty-idUSBRE98O0WV20130925; Arms Trade Treaty, opened for signature
June 3, 2013. (As this Article goes to press, there is no available U.N.T.S. citation information
for this treaty. A copy of the treaty can be found at https://treaties.un.org/
doc/Treaties/2013/04/20130410%2012-01%20PM/Ch_XXVI_08.pdf.).
108. Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Corker Warns Obama
Admin. Against Any Action to Implement U.N. Arms Trade Treaty Without Senate Advice
and
Consent
(Sept.
24,
2013),
http://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/ranking/release/corker-warns-obama-administrationagainst-any-action-to-implement-un-arms-trade-treaty-without-senate-advice-and-consent.
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“object and purpose” of a signed treaty, even while awaiting advice
and consent from the Senate. In doing so, the Restatement (Fourth)
could endorse the president’s role in declaring certain treaty
provisions to be CIL and implementing those CIL provisions while
awaiting Senate action. Third, the Restatement (Fourth) could
confirm the lack of domestic effect of unratified treaties and urge
presidential caution and congressional vigilance with respect to
implementing treaty provisions absent congressional action.
A. No Action
Because this is an emerging interaction between the president
and the Senate, the most cautious, and probably most appropriate
course of action for the Restatement (Fourth) to take is to remain
silent and await further developments. This is especially prudent
given Senator Corker’s recent acknowledgement of this evolving
presidential practice and his warning thereto. As the Restatement is
meant to be a statement on what the law is, as opposed to what it
should be or might become, this would appear to be the approach
most in line with current Restatement practice. Some attention could
be drawn to the emerging practice in the commentary, while not
proposing solutions. Such a course of action would identify the issue,
while not getting ahead of the practice as it develops.
The drawback of such an approach would be, of course, to draw
attention to the recent presidential action without making a
statement about it. This could be interpreted as tacit approval for
presidential action, even if that was not the intent of
the Restatement.
B. Provisional Application
As previously noted, signatories to international agreements,
though not bound to apply the provisions of the treaty or
convention until the domestic ratification process has been
completed, are still “obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat
the object and purpose” of the agreement. 109 Though the actual
109. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 16, art. 18. The
United States is not a party to the Vienna Convention, but generally accepts Article 18 as
CIL. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES pt. 3, intro. note (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (“This Restatement accepts the Vienna
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meaning of “object and purpose” is unclear, 110 if it has any meaning,
it likely precludes any actions that would undermine the actual treaty
itself. Neither the Restatement 111 nor any official U.S. statement has
taken the position that Article 18 requires or even allows certain
actions by the president. In fact, Professor David H. Moore has
argued that this international law obligation forces the president into
an unconstitutional act when signing a treaty prior to receiving the
advice and consent of the Senate. 112
The current version of the Restatement (Fourth) contains a
proposed Section 104 which is titled “Entry into Force of
International Agreements” which comments on the application of
the “object and purpose” obligation. The article states:
(2) A state may also be subject to international obligations
arising from an international agreement (a) if it has expressed its
consent to be bound by some or all of the terms of the agreement,
by means consistent with the agreement, on a provisional basis
pending the agreement’s entry into force, or (b) if it is subject to
interim obligations under the agreement arising from its signature,
exchange of instruments, or ratification, provided that such
provisional application or interim obligations have not been
terminated by it or otherwise ceased to be binding.
(3) While the United States may assume international
obligations in accordance with (1) or (2), the status of these

Convention as, in general, constituting a codification of the customary international law
governing international agreements. . . .”).
110. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 312 cmt. i (AM. LAW. INST. 1987); see generally David H. Moore, The President’s
Unconstitutional Treatymaking, 59 UCLA L. REV. 598 (2011); David S. Jonas and Thomas N.
Saunders, The Object and Purpose of a Treaty: Three Interpretive Methods, 43 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 565 (2010).
111. The Restatement (Third) argues that “[f]ailing to dismantle a weapons scheduled to
be dismantled under the treaty might not defeat its object, since the dismantling could be
effected later.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 312 cmt. i (AM. LAW. INST. 1987).
112. See Moore, supra note 110; see also Jean Galbraith, Prospective Advice and Consent,
37 YALE J. INT’L L. 247 (2012) (arguing that the president should seek “prospective advice
and consent” from the Senate, prior to negotiating and signing an international agreement, as
a method of improving the chances of ratification and the timeliness of such ratification).
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obligations under U.S. domestic law remains subject to the
Constitution and laws of the United States. 113

Paragraph (2)(b) allows that a state can be bound to certain
obligations internationally by a signature on a treaty, paragraph (3)
leaves the domestic effect of that signing unstated.
Comment f to draft Section 104 makes clear that this provision is
intended to deal with Article 18 of the Vienna Convention (which it
says the United States accepts as CIL). 114 The comment states that
“[t]he scope of such interim obligations, however, has remained
unclear, in particular as to the nature of the acts prohibited.” 115 The
comment then goes on to state: “Potential issues relating to the
compatibility of the interim obligation with U.S. law, including
whether adherence to the interim obligation requires legislative
authorization or may be based on the President’s constitutional
authority, have not been resolved.” 116 In other words, it is unclear if
the obligations under Article 18 would provide the president with
sufficient authority to begin enforcing them as previous presidents
have done with UNCLOS III, API, and APII.
Additionally, Section 104(2)(a) contemplates that a state may
become subject to an international agreement’s obligations on a
“provisional basis.” In essence, this is what the various presidents
have done with the treaty provisions analyzed above, though not
through “means consistent with the agreement.” Instead, the
president has, through the means of declaring those treaties or treaty
provisions as CIL and then making them enforceable domestically
against executive agencies, accomplished the same effect as a
provisional acceptance.
Assuming it is not per se unconstitutional for the president to
make provisional declarations that bind the United States as a matter
of international law, 117 it would be easy for the Restatement (Fourth)
to add a similar comment that recognizes the president’s authority to

113. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: TREATIES § 104 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2015).
114. Id. § 104 cmt. f.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. § 104 cmt. e.
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also bind executive agencies as a matter of domestic law. Such
language might be something like the following:
If consent of the Senate or approval by Congress is required for the
entry into force of an international agreement but has not yet been
obtained, an undertaking that it shall have provisional effect for the
United States, both as a matter of international and domestic law,
must normally rest on the President’s own constitutional authority.

If the Restatement (Fourth) took this approach, it would be, in
effect, making a legal determination as to the constitutional
correctness of the president’s course of action. This would be a bold
statement in an area of executive-legislative interaction that is
relatively new and unsettled, and the writers of the Restatement
(Fourth) may not be ready to make that leap.
C. Senate Vigilance
Comment j to Section 312 of Restatement (Third) states: “An
international agreement made by the United States in the form of a
treaty enters into force for the United States when the President,
with the advice and consent of the Senate, has ratified it or otherwise
given official notification of assent to it . . . .” 118 This reinforces the
constitutional requirement that treaties become the “supreme Law
of the Land” 119 only after “the Advice and Consent of the
Senate,” 120 or other accepted congressional involvement, such as in
congressional-executive agreements discussed previously.
The Restatement (Fourth) could make the clear distinction
between provisional application of unratified treaty provisions in
international and domestic law and draw attention to the recent
presidential actions, noting that such action may, in fact, be violative
of the Constitution’s separation of powers paradigm. This could be
accomplished in any number of ways, including by adding language
such as the following:
If consent of the Senate or approval by Congress is required for the
entry into force of an international agreement but has not yet been

118. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 312 cmt. j (AM. LAW. INST. 1987).
119. U.S. CONST., art. VI.
120. Id. art. II, § 2.
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obtained, an undertaking that it shall have provisional effect for the
United States, as a matter of international law, must normally rest
on the President’s own constitutional authority. Provisional
application of non-self-executing agreements as a matter of domestic
law would require Congressional action.

As with the previous suggestion, it seems bold for the
Restatement to step into this discussion in such a decisive way since
the resolution of the constitutionality of the president’s actions is
still unclear.
D. Conclusion
Because this is an emerging trend in presidential-congressional
interaction, taking no action is most likely the best approach for
the Restatement (Fourth). However, the action by successive
presidents to bind executive agencies, including punishments for
non-compliance, deserves at least some consideration by the
drafting committee and the American Law Institute (ALI) more
generally. If no action is warranted at this time, the ALI should at
least take note of the developing practice in preparation for the
Restatement (Fifth).
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has documented recent presidential action to bind
executive agencies to treaty provisions that have not been ratified
but are currently before the Senate for its advice and consent.
Three specific examples highlight this emerging practice. It seems
clear that the president has the authority to direct provisional
application of these provisions as a matter of international law, but
his authority to do so as a matter of domestic law appears
unresolved. Congress has, at least on one occasion, warned the
president to take no such action until the Senate has completed its
constitutional responsibility.
The Restatement (Fourth) has several options with regard to
this emerging practice, including taking no action, supporting the
president’s approach through the “object and purpose”
obligations of signatory nations, and clarifying that provisional
application of non-self-executing agreements as a matter of
domestic law requires congressional action. The first approach—
to take no action and see how the practice develops between the
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two political branches—seems the most prudent at this time.
However, the ALI should at least take note of the developing
practice and, perhaps, promote greater discussion on the issue in
preparation for the Restatement (Fifth).
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